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UNJUSTIFIABLE REFUSALS TO SETTLE
AND RULE 68
JOHN E. SPRIzzo*
There is little doubt that burgeoning civil dockets in the fed-
eral courts, coupled with protracted criminal trials and discovery
abuses, have put an enormous strain on the federal judicial sys-
tem.' That circumstance has led to efforts to control discovery
abuses and to discourage the filing of frivolous actions, pleadings,
and motions through the imposition of sanctions. These efforts
have had some positive impact, but very little, if anything, has
been done about the situation in which one side or the other unjus-
tifiably and without colorable basis refuses to settle a civil action.
Lawyers and litigants are aware that the threat of continuing liti-
gation expense can be effectively used as a pressure device to co-
erce an opponent into settling a matter at a cost well in excess of
what the merits would warrant, but perhaps less than its defense
would entail.
This Article addresses that problem and the various solutions
that are now being proposed and have been proposed to deal with
it, as well as an evaluation of the merits of the arguments ad-
vanced against those proposals.
The only rule which deals directly with the consequences of an
unreasonable refusal to settle is, of course, rule 68.2 That rule,
* Judge, United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
See, e.g., R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 318 (1985) ("[tlhe
crisis in quantity has endangered the quality of federal justice"); Coyle, A Day in the Life of
a Judge, Nat'l L.J., Apr. 25, 1988, at 32, col. 1 (dockets going beyond the "break point"); see
also Rehnquist Says Shortage of Judges Threatens to Clog Federal Courts, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 2, 1988, at 10, col. 3. In his year-end report on the federal judiciary, Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted the high level of pending cases and new filings, and called the shortage of
trial and appellate judges a "serious dilemma." At the beginning of 1988, forty-eight federal
judgeships were vacant, and a judicial advisory panel had recommended the creation of
fifty-six new trial judgeships and thirteen appellate judgeships.
2 Rule 16 indirectly addresses the settlement process. Under this rule, settlement and
the use of extrajudicial procedures are subjects specifically to be discussed at pretrial con-
ferences. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5) (one objective of pretrial conference is facilitating set-
tlement); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (subjects to be discussed include possibility of settlement
and use of extrajudicial procedures). Any benefits from this type of judicial intervention are
limited, however, because the court has no power to force parties to settle or even to compel
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which is clearly inadequate to have any significant impact on the
problem, currently provides that a defendant, but not a plaintiff,
may make an offer of judgment at any time up to ten days before
trial.s The rule further provides that "[i]f the judgment finally ob-
tained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer, the of-
feree must pay the costs incurred after the making of the offer."
Presently, however, rule 68 is not widely used as a means to dis-
pose of cases because it does not authorize reasonable attorneys'
fees as a cost and, therefore, provides no effective deterrent to un-
reasonable refusals to settle.4
The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure has made two suggested revisions of rule 68, neither of which
has been adopted. The first revision, proposed in 1983, received
harsh criticism and, as a result, was followed in 1984 by a second
proposal.
unwilling litigants to discuss settlement. See Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir.
1985) ("pressure tactics to coerce settlement simply are not permissible").
I FED. R. Civ. P. 68. Rule 68 currently provides:
At any time more than 10 days before the trial begins, a party defending against a
claim may serve upon the adverse party an offer to allow judgment to be taken
against the defending party for the money or property or to the effect specified in
the offer, with costs then accrued. If within 10 days after the service of the offer
the adverse party serves written notice that the offer is accepted, either party may
then file the offer and notice of acceptance together with proof of service thereof
and thereupon the clerk shall enter judgment. An offer not accepted shall be
deemed withdrawn and evidence thereof is not admissible except in a proceeding
to determine costs. If the judgment finally obtained by the offeree is not more
favorable than the offer, the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the making
of the offer. The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a
subsequent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been determined
by verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains
to be determined by further proceedings, the party adjudged liable may make an
offer of judgment, which shall have the same effect as an offer made before trial if
it is served within a reasonable time not less than 10 days prior to the commence-
ment of hearings to determine the amount or extent of liability.
Id.
, See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 102 F.R.D. 425, 433-34 (1984) [hereinafter 1984 Proposal]; see also infra note 10
(quoting text of the proposal). The Advisory Committee discussed several reasons why this
rule has not been used. First, only defendants may take advantage of rule 68 as currently
drafted. Often, an award of costs is not enough to encourage defendants to use the rule. In
addition, defendants may rather earn interest than make an early settlement offer. See 1984
Proposal, supra, at 433-34; see also Simon, Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship
Between Offers of Judgment and Statutory Attorney's Fees, 53 U. CIN. L. REv. 889, 891
(1984) (rule 68 widely considered to be a failure).
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THE 1983 PROPOSAL
The 1983 proposal to amend rule 68 suggested several major
changes.5 The new rule, renamed "Offer of Settlement," would
have allowed either party to make an offer and also would have
revised the time periods for making and accepting offers.' More
importantly, the proposal provided that if the judgment finally en-
tered was not more favorable to the offeree than the unaccepted
offer, the offeree would have to pay the offeror's costs and expenses
5 See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 98 F.R.D. 339, 361-63 (1983). The 1983 proposal provides:
At any time more than 30 days before the trial begins, any party may serve
upon an adverse party an offer, denominated as an offer under this rule, to settle a
claim for the money or property or to the effect specified in his offer and to enter
into a stipulation dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accord-
ingly. The offer shall remain open for 30 days unless a court authorizes earlier
withdrawal. An offer not accepted in writing within 30 days shall be deemed with-
drawn. Evidence of an offer is not admissible except in a proceeding to enforce a
settlement or to determine costs and expenses.
If the judgment finally entered is not more favorable to the offeree than an
unaccepted offer that remained open 30 days, the offeree must pay the costs and
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred by the offeror after the
making of the offer, and interest from the date of the offer on any amount of
money that a claimant offered to accept to the extent such interest is not other-
wise included in the judgment. The amount of the expenses and interest may be
reduced to the extent expressly found by the court, with a statement of reasons, to
be excessive or unjustified under all of the circumstances. In determining whether
a final judgment is more or less favorable to the offeree than the offer, the costs
and expenses of the parties shall be excluded from consideration. Costs, expenses,
and interest shall not be awarded to an offeror found by the court to have made
an offer in bad faith.
The fact that an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subse-
quent offer. When the liability of one party to another has been determined by
verdict or order or judgment, but the amount or extent of the liability remains to
be determined by further proceedings, any party may make an offer of settlement
under this rule, which shall be effective for such period of time, not more that 30
days, as is authorized by the court. This rule shall not apply to class or derivative
actions under Rules 23, 23.1, and 23.2.
Id.
, Proposals for either party to make a settlement offer and for a revision of time peri-
ods have appeared in both the 1983 and 1984 revisions and would be beneficial. Both parties
should have the opportunity to make an offer of settlement, rather than only the defendant
as in the present rule. In addition, a flexible time provision is necessary to guard against the
dangers of an early strike settlement offer, or an offer too close to trial when both sides have
already invested too much time and expense in the litigation. The time limits have changed
in the various proposals, but allowing modification of the time periods in the sound discre-
tion of the court would guard against most fears. Offers should be open long enough to allow
parties to fairly gauge settlement options and to secure necessary approval. Also, a court in
its discretion could allow limited discovery so that a decision on whether to accept a settle-
ment offer could be made with a better factual understanding of the case.
1988]
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incurred after the making of the offer, including reasonable attor-
neys' fees.
It was not surprising that this aspect of the new rule attracted
a barrage of criticism from bar associations. Critics argued that the
proposal violated the Rules Enabling Act because it constituted a
substantive rather than a procedural change in that it altered the
American rule that each side pays its own attorneys' fees." Civil
rights attorneys in particular argued that the rule would chill en-
forcement of the civil rights laws because plaintiffs would accept
low offers rather than risk paying the defendant's attorneys' fees."
In my view, none of these arguments justified a rejection of the
proposed rule, as will be discussed below, although I think it is
clear that the proposal was defective in that it created a presump-
tion that a settlement posture was unreasonable based merely on
one side or the other being wrong about the value of the case for
settlement purposes.
THE 1984 PROPOSAL
In response to criticism of the 1983 proposal, the Advisory
Committee offered another proposal in 1984.10 Addressing the at-
7 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982).
1 See, e.g., Woods, For Every Weapon, a Counterweapon: The Revivial of Rule 68, 14
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 283, 344 (1986); Note, The Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68: Toughening the Sanctions, 70 IOWA L. REV. 237, 250-55 (1984); Note,
Current Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 and Official Changes: Important Impacts on
Attorney's Fee Awards, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 209, 222 (1985).
' See Simon, The Riddle of Rule 68, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 14 (1985).
'0 See 1984 Proposal, supra note 4, at 432-33. The 1984 proposal provides:
At any time more than 60 days after the service of the summons and com-
plaint on a party but not less than 90 days (or 75 days if it is a counter-offer)
before trial, either party may serve upon the other party but shall not file with the
court a written offer, denominated as a offer under this rule, to settle a claim for
the money, property, or relief specified in the offer and to enter into a stipulation
dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly. The offer
shall remain open for 60 days unless sooner withdrawn by a writing served on the
offeree prior to acceptance by the offeree. An offer that remains open may be ac-
cepted or rejected in writing by the offeree. An offer that is neither withdrawn nor
accepted within 60 days shall be deemed rejected. The fact that an offer is made
but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer. Evidence of an offer is not
admissible except in proceedings to enforce a settlement or to determine sanctions
under this rule.
If, upon a motion by the offeror within 10 days after the entry of judgment,
the court determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably, resulting in unnec-
essary delay and needless increase in the cost of the litigation, it may impose an
appropriate sanction upon the offeree. In making this determination the court
[Vol. 62:443
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torneys' fees argument, the second proposal abandoned the ap-
proach of basing the award of such fees on the amount of the ulti-
mately obtained judgment. Instead, the 1984 proposal allowed the
court to impose "an appropriate sanction" on an offeree if an offer
was rejected unreasonably. To determine the reasonableness of the
refusal at the time of the offer, the 1984 proposal outlined several
factors for the court to consider. These included the merit of the
claim, the closeness of the issues of law and fact, the information
available for evaluation, the importance of the issues for other
cases, the relief reasonably to be expected, and the projected cost
and delay from subsequent litigation. In addition, the proposal
outlined several factors for determining the amount of sanction,
including the extent of delay, the amount of costs and expenses,
including attorneys' fees, interest on the offer amount, and the
burden on the offeree.
This proposal unquestionably dealt with what I believe to be
the principal drawback of the earlier version, i.e., a presumption of
unreasonableness based upon error alone. Moreover, it focused on
the proper problem to be dealt with, i.e., an unreasonable settle-
ment posture or, put another way, a refusal to settle that is not
colorably justified by the legal and factual merits of the claim at
issue.
However, the 1984 proposal was again criticized by civil rights
attorneys who feared it might chill enforcement of the civil rights
laws. Critics also argued that the need to determine reasonableness
shall consider all of the relevant circumstances at the time of the rejection, includ-
ing (1) the then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim that was the subject
of the offer, (2) the closeness of the questions of fact and law at issue, (3) whether
the offeror had unreasonably refused to furnish information necessary to evaluate
the reasonableness of the offer, (4) whether the suit was in the nature of a "test
case," presenting questions of far-reaching importance affecting non-parties, (5)
the relief that might reasonably have been expected if the claimant should prevail,
and (6) the amount of the additional delay, cost, and expense that the offeror
reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be prolonged.
In determining the amount of any sanction to be imposed under this rule the
court also shall take into account (1) the extent of the delay, (2) the amount of the
parties' costs and expenses, including any reasonable attorney's fees incurred by
the offeror as a result of the offeree's rejection, (3) the interest that could have
been earned at prevailing rates on the amount that a claimant offered to accept to
the extent that the interest is not otherwise included in the judgment, and (4) the
burden of the sanction on the offeree.
This rule shall not apply to class or derivative actions under Rules 23, 23.1,
and 23.2.
1988]
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at the time of the offer would cause collateral litigation and would
force the court to inquire into protected attorney-client conversa-
tions. In addition, critics raised the fear that judges might use the
threat of rule 68 sanctions to coerce settlement.11
Although these are valid concerns, they are not in my view
sufficient to outweigh the benefits to be derived from revising rule
68. Although civil rights suits implement remedial congressional
legislation, a civil rights attorney has no more right than any other
attorney to extort an unfair settlement by the threat of unjustified
litigation expenses, especially since the civil rights defendant faces
the added coercion of paying the plaintiff's attorneys' fees if he
loses. 2 The potential for collateral litigation is likewise no basis to
reject the rule. Indeed, that problem is no different than that
which exists under rule 11, where the courts are frequently called
upon to assess the litigation posture of a party. Furthermore, since
the standard for determining the reasonableness of a settlement
position, as under rule 11, would be objective rather than subjec-
tive, there would be no reason to inquire into privileged attorney-
client conversations.' 3 Finally, it is not a valid objection to the pro-
posal that judges may use it as an improper method of coercing a
settlement. Not only is that a dubious assumption at best, but that
criticism could also be made of rule 11 or, indeed, of any rule
which involves an exercise of judicial discretion. In any event, ap-
pellate review can correct such improper conduct by a district
judge.'4
" See Simon, supra note 9, at 17-18.
2 In Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985), where the Supreme Court held that the attor-
neys' fees awardable to plaintiff under the civil rights law are to be considered "costs"
within the meaning of rule 68, the Court also noted that rule 68's policy of encouraging
settlements is neutral and would neither curtail the access of civil rights plaintiffs to the
courts nor significantly deter them from bringing suit. See id. at 9-10. In fact, the Court
stated, civil rights plaintiffs might benefit by being "compensat[ed] at an earl[y] date with-
out the burdens, stress, and time of litigation." Id. at 10.
"3 The court might only have to consider privileged conversations if there was a dispute
between the attorney and the client as to who should pay the sanction, in which case disclo-
sure of such communications to the court in camera would not violate the attorney-client
privilege. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 91 (3d ed. 1984).
" See Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985). In Kothe, the plaintiff sought
two million dollars in damages for medical malpractice. See id. at 668. The trial judge rec-
ommended that the case settle for between $20,000 and $30,000, and warned that he would
impose sanctions on the dilatory party if the case settled for a comparable figure after the
trial began. See id. at 669. The case was settled for $20,000 after one day of trial, and the
trial court imposed sanctions on the defendant. See id. The court of appeals held that pres-
sure tactics by the trial court to coerce settlement were not permissible. See id. at 669. The
[Vol. 62:443
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The only issue remaining to be examined is whether there is
any legal merit to the contention that proposed rule 68 violates the
Rules Enabling Act. For the reasons that follow, in my view it does
not.
THE AMERICAN RULE AND THE RULES ENABLING ACT
In England, the award of court costs to the losing party in-
cludes attorneys' fees.1" In the United States, however, an Ameri-
can rule has evolved so that each party traditionally has borne its
own attorneys' fees."6 That rule, however, has never been con-
strued in such a way as to prevent the- imposition of attorneys'
costs for misconduct by litigants or their attorneys where such con-
duct results in harassment and needless litigation expense. Indeed,
there are provisions already existing in the present rules of civil
procedure that impose attorneys' fees for such misconduct which
have never been thought to violate the Rules Enabling Act.
Rule 11,17 although the most widely used of these, is not the
only rule providing for the shifting of attorneys' fees. For example,
sanctions may be imposed on a party substantially unprepared or
one failing to appear for a scheduling conference under rule 16(f).'
court noted that the plaintiff had never indicated a willingness to accept less than $50,000
and the defendant should not have been forced to make an offer in the range suggested by
the trial court. See id. at 669-70.
5 See Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967).
" See id. at 717-18. The Court in Fleischmann cited several reasons for the American
rule. First, one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit. Such
a penalty might discourage poor litigants. See id. at 718. Also, the difficulty of determining
reasonable attorneys' fees in every case would be a burden on the courts. See id.
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its adherence to the American rule in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyeska Pipeline, the
court of appeals had awarded attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs based on the court's equitable
powers and the theory that the plaintiffs were acting as a "private attorney general." See id.
at 241. The Supreme Court cited the general rule that litigants pay their own attorneys'
fees. See id. at 257-58. Although several federal statutes utilize a private attorney general
concept to authorize or mandate the award of attorneys' fees, see infra note 23, the Court
did not construe this congressional action to allow the award of attorneys' fees whenever the
courts found that the award would advance an important public policy. See 421 U.S. at 260-
63. The Court refused to judicially change the American rule, which it characterized as
"deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy." See id. at 271.
17 FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see also Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1274 (2d Cir. 1986)
(discussion and interpretation of rule 11), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1373 (1987). See generally
Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189 (1988) (overview and background of rule
11 and federal courts' sanctioning power).
11 See FED. R Civ. P. 16(f) and advisory committee's note; see also Flaherty v. Dayton
Elec. Mfg. Co., 109 F.R.D. 617, 618-19 (D. Mass. 1986) (costs and attorneys' fees awarded
1988]
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In addition, the unjustified signing of a discovery request, re-
sponse, or objection may merit sanctions under rule 26(g), which is
roughly analogous to rule 11.19 Attorneys are also liable for attor-
neys' fees in the case of a refusal to cooperate with discovery under
rule 37(b)(2).2° It is therefore difficult to imagine why fee shifting
under rule 68 for unjustifiable refusals to settle should raise Rules
Enabling Act problems.
In addition, it has been held that the judiciary has the inher-
ent power to award attorneys' fees when a party has acted "in bad
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons,"21 and many
statutes specifically provide for the payment of attorneys' fees, ei-
ther for vexatious conduct 22 or for policy reasons.23
The Rules Enabling Act, under which the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are promulgated, provides only that the Rules
"shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right."24
when plaintiff's counsel was substantially unprepared to participate in conference); Bar-
soumian v. Szozda, 108 F.R.D. 426, 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (court costs and attorneys' fees
assessed for failure to attend pretrial conferences); Lutwin v. City of New York, 106 F.R.D.
502, 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (sanctioned for failure to obey scheduling order).
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) and advisory committee's note.
2o See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) and advisory committee's note.
21 See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982). This statute authorizes costs, expenses, and attorneys'
fees against an attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs
unreasonably and vexatiously." See id.
22 Several statutes allow for the recovery of attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1982); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1982); Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
24 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). The Rules Enabling Act provides:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of
the district courts and courts of appeals of the United States in civil actions, in-
cluding admiralty and maritime cases, and appeals therein, and the practice and
procedure in proceedings for the review by the courts of appeals of decisions of
the Tax Court of the United States and for the judicial review or enforcement of
orders of adminstrative agencies, boards, commissions, and officers.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any sustantive right and shall
preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by the Sev-
enth Amendment to the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress by
the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but not
later than the first day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days after they
have been thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect. Nothing in this title, anything therein to the contrary
notwithstanding, shall in any way limit, supersede, or repeal any such rules here-
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Since the American rule does not and has never protected a liti-
gant or his attorney from being made to pay an opponent's attor-
neys' fees as a sanction for misconduct, the proposed revision of
rule 68 does not effect any substantive change in the American
rule.
SHIFTING ATTORNEYS' FEES UNDER RULE 68
In my view, therefore, the benefits of the proposed changes
clearly outweigh any legal or policy argument that can be made
against them, especially since the 1984 proposal eliminates the
principal defect in the 1983 proposal by not presuming unreasona-
bleness from what may be an honest error.
Instead, the 1984 proposal sets forth a rational, objective stan-
dard that permits the court to look at factors other than merely
the difference between the amounts of the judgment and offer.25 At
the very least, it is an experiment that ought to be tried. If experi-
ence confirms that it is leading to too much litigation over the rea-
sonableness of refusals to settle, an adjustment can be made to
deal with that problem.
One such adjustment might be an amendment to the proposed
rule providing that an inference of unreasonableness would only
arise where the deviation between offer and recovery exceeded a
fixed percentage. For example, the rule could provide that if the
judgment obtained were twenty-five percent lower than the refused
offer, the refusal would be regarded as presumptively unreasona-
ble, which would shift the burden to the offeree to demonstrate to
the court that his settlement position was rational, based on the
factors outlined in the 1984 proposal. Attorneys' fees would be
shifted only if that burden could not be carried.26
tofore prescribed by the Supreme Court.
Id.
I25 This Article has argued for the sanction of costs and attorneys' fees only where there
is an unjustified refusal to settle, and even then the court would have the discretion to
adjust this amount in the interests of justice.
20 This approach could not be used, of course, where a plaintiff or defendant seeks only
injunctive relief and not quantifiable money damages. Both proposals to amend rule 68 ex-
empt class and derivative actions from the rule's application. That exemption is hard to
justify. While the court must pass upon the reasonableness of settlements reached in such
actions, the court has no greater power to deal with unreasonable settlement positions in
these cases than it has in any other cases. It is therefore hard to discern why lawyers and
litigants should not face the consequences of misconduct in those cases as well. Certainly
rule 11 contains no similar exemption.
1988]
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CONCLUSION
An amendment of rule 68, as outlined above, should be
adopted. The amended rule would not create a radical change in
the American rule, nor would it violate the Rules Enabling Act.
Instead, within the scope of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
it would be simply another rule which imposes a sanction for un-
justified conduct. Here, that unjustified conduct would be the un-
justified refusal to settle a case. While on the one hand, settlement
should not be coerced, litigants should not be permitted to drag
litigation out in the face of a reasonable settlement offer. Where
the settlement posture is rational, a court should not interfere, but
if litigants and parties take unjustifiable settlement positions, they
should face the prospect of paying the costs and attorneys' fees
which their adversary will incur as a result of that unreasonable
conduct.
